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OPINION OF THE COURT
            
FISHER, Circuit Judge.
This appeal arises from an order of the District Court,
entered January 28, 2009, reversing in part the Opinion of the
Special Education Appeals Panel and granting equitable relief
under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”
or “the Act”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq., to Appellee Ferren C.
The District Court ordered Appellant, the School District of
Philadelphia, to annually do the following for the duration of the
three years of Ferren’s previously awarded compensatory
education:  reevaluate her, develop and issue an Individualized
Education Plan, and serve as her Local Education Agency.  The
3School District argues that the relief granted was not appropriate
because Ferren is no longer entitled to the protections of the
IDEA since she is over the age of twenty-one, and that the
District Court’s order is inconsistent with the purposes of the
IDEA.  Because we find that the District Court had the equitable
power under the IDEA to grant relief of this nature and because
the relief furthers the purposes of the IDEA, we will affirm the
order of the District Court.
I.
Appellee Ferren C. (“Ferren”) is a twenty-four-year-old
woman who suffers from various disabilities, including autism,
speech and language deficits, and pervasive developmental
disorder.  Ferren requires highly structured, systematic
instruction that is specifically keyed to her particular educational
needs.  Ferren’s parents lack the training and experience to
develop a compensatory education program for her.
At all relevant times, Ferren lived within the jurisdiction
of the School District of Philadelphia (the “School District”).
The School District identified Ferren as eligible for special
education services under the IDEA.  Failures on the part of the
School District to provide adequate special education to Ferren
gave rise to various legal disputes between the School District
and Ferren’s family.  In resolution of these past disputes, the
School District established a trust fund in excess of $200,000 to
provide Ferren with three years of compensatory education past
her twenty-first birthday.  There is no dispute between the
parties as to the amount of the trust fund or whether Ferren is
entitled to the three years of compensatory education.
4For three school years from 2004 to 2007, Ferren
attended the Elwyn-Davidson School (“Elwyn”), which is an
Approved Private School under the IDEA, and received a basic
academic program, transition activities, and speech and
occupational therapy.  Elwyn requires all enrolled students to
have an Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”) and is capable of
performing much of the underlying work required to develop
and revise an IEP.  When Elwyn develops an IEP, a school
district is not involved in the drafting, but because Elwyn is not
a Local Education Agency (“LEA”), it nevertheless requires a
student’s home school district to sign the IEP and serve as the
student’s LEA.  The student’s parents, the School District, and
Elwyn staff do, however, work together to determine if the IEP
is appropriate under the IDEA.
The 2006-07 school year was the last year Ferren
attended Elwyn with an IEP issued by the School District.  It
was during that school year that Ferren turned twenty-one.  Per
the terms of its license, Elwyn does not typically educate
students past the age of twenty-one, but has previously done so
in cases of compensatory education.  The School District has
acknowledged that Elwyn provided Ferren with appropriate
education and is capable of providing Ferren with compensatory
education in the future.  Ferren’s parents hoped to keep Ferren
enrolled at Elwyn, despite her age, and planned to utilize the
compensatory education trust funds for her tuition.
On September 6, 2006, shortly before Ferren turned
twenty-one, the School District agreed with Elwyn to schedule
Ferren’s graduation for 2010, which was three years beyond the
school year during which she turned twenty-one.  On January 3,
52007, the School District reversed course and informed Elwyn
that Ferren should graduate at the end of the 2007 school year
because she was over the age of twenty-one and was no longer
entitled to an IEP under the IDEA.  Elwyn informed the School
District that it would not graduate Ferren until the School
District confirmed that it had satisfied its compensatory
education obligations to Ferren.  Elwyn received no response
from the School District and, consequently, did not graduate
Ferren in the spring of 2007.
In June 2007, Elwyn informed the School District that it
would provide compensatory education to Ferren past her
twenty-first birthday if the School District paid the entire cost of
the services, provided Ferren with annual IEPs, and served as
her LEA.  The School District agreed to provide the necessary
funding for tuition through Ferren’s previously established trust
fund, but refused to provide IEPs and to serve as the LEA.
Ferren’s parents requested a special education due
process hearing to address the School District’s refusal to
provide Ferren with the additional services requested by Elwyn.
The Hearing Officer issued a decision in October 2007,
concluding that the School District was not required to provide
Ferren with an IEP during the three-year compensatory
education period.  The family appealed this decision to the
Pennsylvania Special Education Appeals Panel (“Appeals
Panel”), which subsequently affirmed the Hearing Officer’s
decision.
On February 21, 2008, Ferren brought an action in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
1The District Court was also faced with the question of
whether Ferren’s placement at Elwyn was pendent during these
judicial proceedings under the stay-put provision of the IDEA.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j).  Under the relevant part of that
provision, “during the pendency of any proceedings conducted
pursuant to this section, unless the State or local educational
agency and the parents otherwise agree, the child shall remain
in the then-current educational placement of the child.”  Id.  The
District Court denied Ferren’s request for pendency as a
statutory right under section 1415(j) finding that the IDEA does
not protect young adults who are over the age of twenty-one.
The District Court also declined to find Ferren’s placement
pendent as a matter of equitable relief.  These issues are not
challenged by either party on appeal.
6
Pennsylvania challenging the administrative decisions of the
Hearing Officer and Appeals Panel.  Both parties submitted
motions for judgment on the administrative record.  In a
January 28, 2009 order, the District Court ordered the School
District for the duration of her three years of compensatory
education to annually reevaluate Ferren, provide her with annual
IEPs, and serve as her LEA.
The School District filed a timely notice of appeal
challenging the District Court’s grant of equitable relief to
Ferren.1
II.
7The District Court had jurisdiction over the appeal from
the Appeals Panel under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A).  We have
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review the District Court’s award of an equitable
remedy under the IDEA for abuse of discretion.  Lester H. v.
Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 872 (3d Cir. 1990).  “An abuse of
discretion occurs when a district court’s decision rests upon a
clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or
an improper application of law to fact.”  P. N. v. Clementon Bd.
of Educ., 442 F.3d 848, 852 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).  To the extent a district court’s
grant of equitable relief is based on a legal determination, we
exercise plenary review.  Id.
III.
We must determine whether the compensatory education
awarded to Ferren by the District Court was permitted under the
IDEA.
The IDEA requires States that receive federal funding to
provide a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) to all
disabled students.  20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A).  Under the IDEA,
a school district’s obligations to provide and a student’s right to
receive a FAPE both terminate when the child reaches the age
of twenty-one.  20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A); Lauren W. v.
DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 272 (3d Cir. 2007).  “The core of
[the] entitlement [to a FAPE] is provided by the IEP, the
package of special educational and related services designed to
meet the unique needs of the disabled child.”  Carlisle Area Sch.
8v. Scott P., 62 F.3d 520, 526 (3d Cir. 1995).  The IDEA does not
set forth definitive guidelines for the formulation of an IEP, but
at a minimum, “[t]he IEP must be ‘reasonably calculated’ to
enable the child to receive ‘meaningful educational benefits’ in
light of the student’s ‘intellectual potential.’”  Shore Reg’l High
Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. P.S., 381 F.3d 194, 198 (3d Cir. 2004)
(quoting Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Interm. Unit 16, 853 F.2d
171, 181 (3d Cir. 1988)); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A);
Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 189 (1982).  The right to
a FAPE ensures that students with special education needs
receive the type of education that will “prepare them for further
education, employment, and independent living.”  20 U.S.C.
§ 1400(d)(1)(A).
Individuals who believe that their rights under the IDEA
have been violated are permitted to bring a civil action in federal
court.  See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2).  To resolve these claims, the
IDEA permits a court to “grant such relief as the court
determines is appropriate.”  20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii).  The
Act is silent, however, as to what type of relief is “appropriate.”
In addressing what is “appropriate” relief under the IDEA, the
Supreme Court concluded that the “only possible interpretation
[of section 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii)] is that the relief is to be
‘appropriate’ in light of the purposes of the act.”  Burlington v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985).  The purposes of the
Act are explicitly stated in its text.  Two of these purposes are
relevant to our analysis:
(1)(A) to ensure that all children with disabilities
have available to them a free appropriate public
education that emphasizes special education and
9related services designed to meet their unique
needs and prepare them for further education,
employment, and independent living;
(B) to ensure that the rights of children with
disabilities and parents of such children are
protected;
20 U.S.C. § 1400(d).  In evaluating whether the District Court’s
grant of equitable relief under the IDEA was appropriate, we
must determine whether the relief granted furthers the above-
stated purposes of the Act.
The relief granted by courts under section
1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) is primarily compensatory education.
Compensatory education, however, is not defined within the
IDEA and is a judicially created remedy.  It is intended as “a
remedy to compensate [the student] for rights the district already
denied . . . because the School District violated [the] statutory
rights while [the student] was still entitled to them.”  Lester H.,
916 F.2d at 872.  The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia has stated that compensatory education serves to
“replace[] educational services the child should have received in
the first place” and that such awards “should aim to place
disabled children in the same position they would have occupied
but for the school district's violations of IDEA.”  Reid v. District
of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 518 (D.C. Cir. 2005).  Federal
courts began awarding compensatory education after the
Supreme Court determined in Burlington that tuition
reimbursement was an appropriate remedy under the Education
of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1983)
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(IDEA’s predecessor).  471 U.S. at 370-71.  Despite the text of
section 1412(a)(1)(A), which statutorily limits a school district’s
obligation to provide a FAPE only to students under the age of
twenty-one, an individual over that age is still eligible for
compensatory education for a school district’s failure to provide
a FAPE prior to the student turning twenty-one.  Lester H., 916
F.2d at 872.  A court may grant compensatory education in such
cases through its equitable power under section
1415(i)(2)(C)(iii).
In this case, the District Court acknowledged that because
of her age, Ferren no longer had a statutory right to FAPE.  See
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A).  However, Ferren was still eligible
for equitable relief.  The District Court determined that the
statutory age bar did not limit the available form of relief to a
monetary award of compensatory education.  Rather, the District
Court concluded that it had the equitable power under section
1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) to order the School District to provide Ferren,
who was past her twenty-first birthday, with annual IEPs and to
serve as her LEA for the duration of her compensatory
education.
In fashioning discretionary equitable relief under the
IDEA, a court must “consider all relevant factors.”  Florence
County Sch. Dist. v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 16 (1993).
Accordingly, the District Court weighed “the interests of
finality, efficiency, and use of the School District’s resources
with the compelling needs of Ferren and her family” and
concluded, based on the specific facts of this case, that the
equitable award was appropriate to further the purposes of the
11
IDEA.  Ferren C. v. Sch. Dist. of Philadephia, 595 F. Supp. 2d
566, 578-80 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
We agree with the District Court’s conclusions that (1) it
had the power to award this type of specific non-monetary
equitable relief, and (2) that the award was appropriate under the
IDEA based on the specific facts of this case.
In both Burlington and Forest Grove School District v.
T.A., __ U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2484 (2009), the Supreme Court
declined to limit courts’ discretion in granting equitable relief
under the IDEA.
In Burlington, the Supreme Court held that section
1415(i)(2)(C)(iii)’s grant of authority includes “the power to
order school authorities to reimburse parents for their
expenditures on private special education services if the court
ultimately determines that such placement, rather than a
proposed IEP, is proper under the Act.”  471 U.S. at 369.  The
Court reasoned that “a final judicial decision on the merits of an
IEP will in most instances come a year or more after the school
term covered by that IEP has passed.”  Id. at 370.  Parents who
disagree with a school’s proposed IEP face the choice of
continuing in public school with the deficient IEP or paying for
more appropriate schooling.  If the parents choose private
school, “it would be an empty victory to have a court tell them
several years later that they were right [in their choice for
private school] but that these expenditures could not in a proper
case be reimbursed by the school officials.”  Id.  As such, the
Court concluded that in mandating that participating States
provide a FAPE for every student, Congress could not have
12
intended to require parents either to accept an inadequate
public-school education pending adjudication of their claim or
bear the cost of a private education if the court ultimately
determined that the private placement was proper under the Act.
Id.
In Forest Grove, the Court addressed whether, under the
IDEA, awarding reimbursement for private education was
appropriate when the student had never received special
education through the public school system.  129 S. Ct. at 2488.
The student in Forest Grove was removed by his parents from
public school and placed in private school.  He never received
special education services from the public school district.  His
parents then requested a hearing for his eligibility for special-
education services under the IDEA.  The school district argued
that the IDEA categorically barred reimbursement unless a child
has “previously received special education or related services
under the [school’s] authority.”  Id. at 2486 (citing 20 U.S.C.
1412(a)(10)(C)(ii)).
The Supreme Court disagreed and found that while the
specific circumstance in that case was not explicitly provided for
in the IDEA, private school reimbursement was appropriate
relief under equitable principles pursuant to 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(i)(2)(C).  The Court reasoned that “[w]ithout [this
reimbursement], a ‘child’s right to a free appropriate education
. . . would be less than complete.’”  Id. at 2495-96 (citing
Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369).  As such, the Court found that the
IDEA did not categorically bar reimbursement of private
education tuition if a child had not previously received special
education and related services through the public school.
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While neither Burlington nor Forest Grove addressed the
specific type of equitable relief granted in this case, we find
nothing in the text of those opinions that forecloses the type of
equitable award provided to Ferren by the District Court.  Nor
do we find case law from our sister circuits that supports the
argument that a court’s power to grant equitable relief under the
IDEA is simply limited to monetary awards.
Applying the standard set forth in Burlington, we find
that the relief granted here was “appropriate” under the IDEA
because it furthers the purposes of the Act.  See Burlington, 471
U.S. at 369 (relief under section 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) is
“appropriate” if it furthers the purposes of the IDEA).  Ferren’s
specialized education at Elwyn will address her “unique needs
and prepare [her] for further education, employment, and
independent living.”  20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A).  The equitable
relief will further ensure that Ferren’s educational rights under
the IDEA are enforced and that she receives the education to
which she was statutorily entitled.  Id. at § 1400(d)(1)(B).
The School District has already funded a trust fund to
provide Ferren with compensatory education.  The purpose of
this monetary award – to make up for past failures on the part of
the School District – would be frustrated because Ferren could
not remain at Elwyn without the School District providing IEPs
and serving as Ferren’s LEA.  Elwyn is able to provide Ferren
with the unique educational services that her severe disabilities
require.  Allowing the School District to refuse to provide IEPs
and to simply fund Ferren’s compensatory education would
undoubtedly further hamper Ferren’s education and deprive her
of her educational rights under the IDEA.
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Finally, a “money-only” type of award for Ferren is
exactly the type of empty victory that the Supreme Court sought
to avoid in Burlington.  471 U.S. at 370.  During her time in the
School District, Ferren was deprived of a FAPE, and, by
extension, an IEP.  Compensatory education is “a remedy to
compensate [] for rights the district already denied.”  Lester H.,
916 F.2d at 872.  If an individual was deprived of his or her
right to an adequate FAPE, and by extension an IEP, prior to the
age of twenty-one, it follows that the student could only be fully
compensated by an award of compensatory education that
contains the elements of a FAPE that she was previously denied.
There is nothing in the IDEA that evinces Congressional intent
to limit courts’ equitable power to awards of only financial
support.  In certain cases, such as the one here, monetary awards
can not fully compensate a student for a school district’s past
failures.
The School District expressed concerns that by extending
its obligations to provide an IEP past a student’s twenty-first
birthday we open the door to a large number of other students
seeking IEPs as a part of compensatory education past their
twenty-first birthday and will subject the School District to
ongoing litigation costs as challenges are made to the adequacy
of these IEPs.  While we acknowledge these legitimate concerns
given the budget constraints faced by school districts, both
arguments are ultimately unavailing.
The District Court in its opinion was careful to note, and
we echo its conclusion, that this specific type of equitable relief
would only be granted on a case-by-case basis, depending on the
specific situation of each student.  In each case, a court will
15
evaluate the specific type of relief that is appropriate to ensure
that a student is fully compensated for a school district’s past
violations of his or her rights under the IDEA and develop an
appropriate equitable award.  Further, any additional litigation
over the adequacy of the compensatory education can be
minimized if the School District simply complies with the
requirements of the IDEA.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District
Court’s order awarding compensatory education to Ferren.
